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UNITY AND PLURALISM IN CONTRACT
LAW
Nathan Oman*
CONTRACT THEORY. By Stephen A. Smith. New York: Oxford
University Press. 2004. Pp. xxvi, 450. $35.

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a cliche of contemporary legal scholarship that, in the last few
decades, the study of law has witnessed a vast proliferation of
competing theoretical approaches. The old faith in the careful honing
of doctrinal concepts and the essential usefulness of legal analysis has
given way to a cacophony of competing theoretical sects. 1 Economists,
moral philosophers, sociologists, historians, and others have stepped
forward to offer the insights of this or that discipline as a new and
superior path to legal enlightenment. Perhaps nowhere has this cliche
been truer than in the realm of contracts scholarship, where, for a
generation, the competing disciplinary approaches have been
energetically proselytizing for their chosen theories. Hence, modern
legal scholarship abounds with economic, philosophical, and
sociological theories of contract law.
Most contracts scholars take one of two basic approaches. On one
side stand those who, while acknowledging the usefulness of the new
theoretical tools, remain unconverted to any of them. With lawyerly
pragmatism, they remain skeptical of unifying theoretical enterprises.
Human experience and the law are too complex for academic
reductionism, they argue, and "a good gray compromise" of
competing principles and policies2 is the best that we can hope for. On

* Associate, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, Washington, DC. B.A. 1999, Brigham
Young; J.D. 2003, Harvard.- Ed. This article does not represent the views of my employer
or any of its clients. I would like to thank Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold, Robert Frommer,
Jody Kraus, Val Ricks, Eric Andersen, Gordon Smith, Ashlie Warnick, and Kaimi Wenger
for their help with this project. The standard disclaimers apply. As always, I thank Heather.
1. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REv. 761 (1987) (chronicling the rise of interdisciplinary
approaches to legal scholarship and the decline of doctrinalism).
2 See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 701 n.14 (1990).
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the other side are those who declare that "theory works." 3 The
problem with pragmatism, they assert, is that ultimately it fails to
provide either illumination or concrete conclusions. We are left with
little more than a series of ad hoc ipse dixits lacking coherence or
justification. In contrast, rigorous theory of one sort or another offers
the promise of real understanding. Obviously, both portraits are
overdrawn, and individual scholars fall at different points along the
spectrum between them. Nevertheless, the tension between
pragmatism and theory explicitly or implicitly pervades much of
contemporary contracts scholarship.
Into this discussion comes Contract Theory by Stephen A. Smith. 4
Published as part of Oxford University Press's Clarendon Law Series,
Smith's book, despite its aggressively boring title, is a fascinating and
important contribution to the current debates. Part textbook and part
original analysis, Smith surveys most of the prominent contemporary
theories of contract law and ultimately offers a detailed argument in
favor of a unified theory built around the moral force of promising.5
Smith is a legal philosopher by training, and he has a philosopher's
faith in theory. Hence, Contract Theory squarely challenges the
pragmatic approach to contract law. Smith admits that "[i]n the
end ... because there is little consensus as to the best theory of
contract, studying contract theory mainly entails learning about
competing theories" (p. viii). Nevertheless, he clearly believes one
may hope for greater unity and precision than "a good gray
compromise," and one of Contract Theory's contributions is Smith's
sustained discussion and defense of a set of criteria for winnowing out
defective theories.
Ultimately, however, Smith's laudable desire for theoretical rigor
ignores the possibility the pragmatic approach to contract law
suggests: a principled reconciliation of competing approaches. Smith
argues for an essentially unified theory. He seeks to defend his
promissory approach by arguing for the wholesale rejection of
competing alternatives, most notably reliance and efficiency theories.
The "good gray compromise" school of thought, however,
acknowledges that such outright dismissals are problematic. Most
people have powerful intuitions that autonomy, efficiency, and
corrective justice should all play important roles in our understanding
of contract law. "Theory works" partisans rightly respond that such
intuitions, by themselves, fail to provide us any way to coherently

3. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACf LAW AND THEORY (3d ed.
2004).

4. Professor of Law, McGill University.
5. Briefly stated, this is the theory that certain promises to perform some action create a
moral obligation to act, for the breach of which the law should provide a remedy.
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integrate those competing values. Smith's work graphically illustrates
this quandary. His quest for theoretical unity leads him to make a
series of problematic arguments dismissing efficiency theories. Indeed,
in his drive to ground contract law in a single normative principle, he
comes to the startling conclusion that many of what we think of as the
core rules of the subject - such as those governing breach and
damages - are not actually part of contract law at all. The difficulties
Smith faces suggest that, rather than trying to unite all of contract law
under a single normative principle, theorists should turn their
attention toward providing a principled way of integrating competing
approaches to contract in a single theory. As an example, I will
present my strategy for reconciling the values of autonomy and
efficiency into a single theory, while neither dismissing one approach
nor falling into the trap of making ad hoc choices between them.
This Review proceeds as follows. I begin, in Part II by placing
Smith's book in the context of the contemporary scholarly literature
on contracts and detailing some of its main contributions. Next, in Part
III, I turn to Smith's attempt to offer a theoretically unified view of
contract law, outlining the arguments he uses to establish this unity
and explaining why they are ultimately unpersuasive. Finally, in Part
IV, I suggest that, in place of theoretical unity, contracts theorists
should turn their attention to the possibility of a "principled
pluralism" and put forward a set of arguments suggesting how this
might be accomplished.
II.

CONTRACT THEORY AND THE PRESENT SITUATION

The past three decades have seen a succession of ambitious books
on the theory of contract law. Patrick Atiyah's magisterial The Rise
and Fall of Freedom of Contract told a story of common law judges
who labored, in vain, to construct a theory of contract law organized
solely around the idea of party autonomy. 6 Grant Gilmore told a
pithier, American version of this same tale in The Death of Contract,
where he suggested that contract's days were numbered and it would
soon subside into tort, which Gilmore insisted was the residual form of
civil liability. 7 In response to these attacks, Charles Fried penned
Contract as Promise, which insisted that a consistent theory of contract
based on party autonomy is possible and provides the best
interpretation of legal doctrine. 8 More recently, Michael Trebilcock
has written The Limits of Freedom of Contract, which surveyed a

6. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACf (1979).
7. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACf (1974).
8. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACf AS PROMISE (1981).
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variety of problems in contract law and brought to bear the insights of
twenty years of industrious law and economics scholarship. 9
Smith's work is the latest volume in this conversation. Unlike the
others, Smith sets out to provide a more or less comprehensive survey
of contract theory. He is mainly successful, although his performance
is not without faults. His treatment of economic theories is ultimately
unpersuasive. In addition, there are some rather unaccountable
absences in the book. For instance, Smith pays virtually no attention
to the work of James Gordley and others seeking to articulate a neeAristotelian theory of contract. 10 Still, a student or scholar looking for
a compendium of recent work on the philosophy of contract law is not
likely to find a more detailed overview than Contract Theory. It is,
however, much more than a mere summary of contemporary contract
scholarship. It also offers a spirited defense of a much maligned theory
in American jurisprudence: contract as promise.
Promissory theories of contract have not been popular in
American scholarship. Under the influence first of Lon Fuller 11 and
later of Grant Gilmore, 12 many American scholars have found reliance
to be a more attractive basis than promise for explaining and justifying
contract law. The promissory theory has been associated with the
discredited "classical" view of contract, and for many scholars there is
something suspiciously Willistonian about it. On this view, it is a
theoretical mirage from which Corbin and section ninety of the
Restatement have delivered legal thought. It is not without its
partisans, most prominently Charles Fried. 13 Yet Fried's theory has
gained few followers and even theorists that share the libertarian
sensibilities behind Contract as Promise have criticized it. 14 Smith, on
the other hand, concludes that a promissory theory provides the best

9. MICHAELS. TREBILCOCK, THE LiMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993). See also
JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE
(1991), and ROBERT A. HILLAM, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW (1997); both also
deserve honorable mention.
10. See GORDLEY, supra note 9 (setting forth Gordley's argument that modern contract
doctrine is best understood using the theories of late-scholastic philosophers); see also James
Bernard Murphy, Equality in Exchange, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 85 (2002) (arguing for an
Aristotelian theory of contract law). Smith does discuss Gordley's work in a single footnote
in which he says: "[W]hile I cannot defend the claim here, it is suggested that insofar as
Gordley's theory is meant to provide a positive justification for contractual obligations
(rather than only a reason for limiting their scope), it disaggregates into a mixture of
utilitarian and rights-based justifications." P. 52 n.16.
11. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
12 See GILMORE, supra note 7.
13. See FRIED, supra note 8.
14. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems With Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 1022 (1992).
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account of contract law. He thus offers a useful restatement and
deepening of the argument in favor of contract as promise.
According to Smith, the most telling normative objection to
promissory theories rests on the harm principle. Famously formulated
by John Stuart Mill, the harm principle states that in a liberal society,
the machinery of the state can be legitimately used to prevent harm to
others but should not be used to enforce moral obligations whose
violation do not result in harm. 15 Most promissory theories
conceptualize promise breaking as an immoral act. The harm
principle, however, suggests that the immorality of promise breaking is
not a sufficient reason to mandate government enforcement of that
promise. Smith's solution to this problem is what he calls an intrinsic
view of promising (p. 74). Promises, he asserts, are intrinsically
valuable because they create a special relationship between the
promisor and the promisee. Promise breaking harms this special
relationship by taking something intrinsically valuable to the promisee
(the promise) and destroying it. 16 The advantage of such a view is that
it transforms contract law from a species of mere morality
enforcement into the forestalling of harm to another. Thus the harm
principle is neatly sidestepped and can actually be invoked as a reason
for enforcing promises.
Much of Contract Theory is taken up with a detailed application of
various theories to different doctrinal areas. 17 He admits there are
some areas where promissory theories offer only an incomplete and, in
some sense, unsatisfactory account of the law. 18 He nevertheless
concludes that his modified promissory theory offers the best
interpretation of contract law. Hence, Smith's contribution to
promissory theory is twofold: First, he offers a subtle new argument
about promising that purports to avoid a key objection that has
dogged such theories in the past. Second, he examines the application

15. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
16. In stark contrast to Smith's theory, Dori Kimel has recently argued that the legal
enforcement of promises has precisely the opposite effect to the one posited by Smith.
According to Kimel, legal enforcement actually undermines the trust that makes promising a
valuable activity. See Dori Kimel, Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract, 21
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 473 (2001); see also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Promises, Trust, and
Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25 (2002) (responding to Kimel's arguments).
17. See pp. 167-208 ("Establishing Agreement: The Law of Offer and Acceptance"); pp.
209-244 ("The Kinds of Agreements that are Enforced: Formalities, Intention to Create
Legal Relations, Consideration, and Estoppel"); pp. 245-268 ("The Kinds of Agreements not
Enforced: Substantive Limitations on Enforceability"); pp. 269-314 ("The Content of the
Contract: Interpreting and Implying Terms"); pp. 315-375 ("Excuses for Non-performance:
Duress, Unconscionability, Mistake, Misrepresentation, Frustration, and Discharge for
Breach"); pp. 376-386 ("Breach of Contract: The Puzzle of Strict Liability"); pp. 387-431
("Remedies for Breach").
18. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing Smith's admission that the concept of promising
cannot account for certain doctrinal areas).
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of promissory theories across a greater range of doctrinal topics and in
greater depth than any prior legal philosopher.
Ill. UNIFYING CONTRACT LAW

The theoretical heart of Contract Theory, however, does not lie in
its usefulness as a survey or as a restatement of the promise theory.
Indeed, Smith's defense of promise rests less on his arguments about
the function and importance of promising than on his approach to
dealing with theories. The core of Smith's argument is a set of criteria
for judging between competing theories of contract. These criteria
offer an intriguing framework for dealing with the central issue in the
philosophy of contract law: the brute fact of theoretical pluralism.
Contract theory suffers from an embarrassment of riches. Roughly
speaking there are two main camps, one of which contains two
significant subcamps. On one side sit the economic theories, which not
surprisingly argue that contract law should be guided by notions of
efficiency and welfare maximization. On the other side sit what Smith
labels "rights-based" theories. These come in essentially two different
flavors: those that see contract as properly focusing on compensating
parties who detrimentally relied on the promises of others, and those
that see contract as properly focusing on promising itself as an
independent source of legal obligation. 19 Both the reliance and
promissory theories (also called "autonomy theories") share an
essentially ex post perspective. They both see contract law primarily as
a way of compensating a disappointed promisee for harm to some
entitlement. Their disagreement lies in how they account for the
genesis and scope of the promisee's protected interest. Both, however,
share the basic paradigm of corrective justice. In contrast, efficiency
theorists take an essentially ex ante approach. Rather than focusing on
the problems of entitlement and compensation, they look to the
incentives that contract rules create for rational actors and then argue
that we should adopt rules that generate economically efficient
outcomes. The problem lies in the apparent incommensurability of
these two approaches. Jody Kraus aptly summarizes the issue, writing:
As normative theories, economic contract theories would seem to be
logically incompatible with autonomy contract theories for the same
reason that consequentialist moral theories are logically incompatible
with deontological moral theories: The former claim that moral

19. One could also add so-called transfer theories, which conceptualize contracts as the
voluntary alienation of rights. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contracts, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986); Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAW 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). Smith discusses these theories at some
length, but ultimately dismisses them as unpersuasive because of their inability to explain
how future performance can be explained in terms of a right held in the present. See
generally pp. 97-103.
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justification is solely a function of consequences, while the latter claim
that moral justification is independent of moral consequences. 20

Without some way of choosing between these theories or otherwise
reconciling them, contract theory is deeply incoherent. It lacks the
ability to generate consistent normative or descriptive theories of the
lawY
A. A Theory About Theories

The philosophy of contract law thus faces a thorny problem of
normative pluralism. How are we to choose between competing
approaches? To his credit, Smith tackles this problem head on. The
first forty pages of Contract Theory consists of a careful elaboration of
criteria for choosing between competing approaches. Smith takes an
essentially interpretivist approach to the question. The purpose of
contract theory, on this view, is not to provide us first with an ideal
normative framework and only then offer concrete rules of law that
flow from that framework. Rather, one takes contract law as it
currently exists and seeks an explanation that renders it as coherent
and intelligible as possible. According to Smith, this internal approach
generates four concrete criteria by which to judge theories: fit,
coherence, morality, and transparency. These criteria then form the
heart of Smith's argument for rejecting efficiency theories of contract
in favor of the rights-based approach.
1.

Fit and Coherence

The concepts of fit and coherence are pretty straightforward. In
order for a normative theory to make current law intelligible, it must
generate concrete rules that more or less track current law. Suppose
one was looking for a theory that rendered the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition on slavery intelligible. Obviously, one could
not use Aristotle's argument for the natural inferiority of some people
and the justice of enslaving them to provide such a theory. 22 The legal
rules Aristotle's theory suggest are simply too at odds with the rule set
forth in the Thirteenth Amendment. By the same token, a theory that
20. Jody Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical
Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420, 420 (2001); see also Kaimipono David Wenger &
David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1138 (2003) (discussing the
conflict between economic and moral theories in the context of tort law).
21. By "descriptive theory," I do not mean sociological type descriptions of legal
practice or even traditional doctrinal accounts of contract law. Rather, I am referring to the
process of interpreting the practice of contract law and rendering it internally intelligible.
Accordingly, in this context, "interpretive" serves as a synonym for "descriptive."

22. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. VII; ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS,
Bk. I, ch. ii-vii.
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implied that contract law ought to provide a cause of action only
against those who maliciously breach their agreements is too wide of
the current law to render it intelligible.23 Coherence is even simpler. A
theory that generates contradictory conclusions obviously suffers from
a basic problem of consistency. Smith also suggests that consistency
requires that a theory rendering a particular body of law intelligible
must account for the fact it is thought of as a distinct body of law.
"More specifically," he writes, "to explain why contract law merits the
title 'contract law', a good theory must show that most of the core
elements of contract law can be traced to, or are closely related to, a
single principle" (p. 13).
2.

Morality

Smith subscribes to Joseph Raz's claim that the concept of law, as
an analytic matter, always consists of a claim to authority. 24 Part of
what we mean when we use the term "law" is the idea that one has an
obligation to obey the law. This authoritative aspect of law is part of
what differentiates its commands from those of a highway robber.
Hence, any theory of law must also be in some sense a moral theory. It
must purport at least to explain why the law is authoritative. This does
not require that it necessarily be a good moral theory. Smith
differentiates three different versions of the morality criterion. Under
a very weak version, the theory must simply make an identifiable
moral claim, even if it is clearly incorrect. For example, the
Nuremberg laws passed by the Third Reich rested on theories of racial
superiority and the legitimacy of anti-Semitism that are analytically
identifiable as moral claims even if those claims are not themselves
morally defensible. A middling version of the criterion asserts that a
legal theory must contain a moral theory that is both analytically
identifiable as a moral claim and also within the range of reasonable
moral positions, even if ultimately mistaken. Finally, the strongest
version of the moral criterion requires that the moral component of a
legal theory be ethically correct.
3.

Transparency

The transparency criterion has to do with the sorts of arguments
judges offer when they expound the law. The claim is that judicial

23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 252(2) (1979) ("When performance
of a duty under contract is due, any non-performance is a breach." (emphasis added)).
24. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY
OF LAW AND POLITICS 199 (1994) ("I will assume that necessarily law, every legal system

which is in force anywhere, has de facto authority. That entails that the law either claims that
it possesses legitimate authority or is held to possess it, or both.").
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opmwns are part of the legal data to be rendered intelligible.
According to Smith:
The transparency criterion evaluates contract theories according to how
well they account for what may be called the 'legal' or 'internal'
explanation of contract law .... That law is understood from the inside as
transparent is clear: law-makers, and in particular judges, give public
reasons for acting as they do and those reasons are presented as their
real reasons. The report of a legal decision is not mere window dressing;
it is meant to explain why the plaintiff did or did not win. (pp. 24-25)

Hence, any successful theory must fit not only the rules in the common
law of contracts but also the arguments judges use to justify their
decisions under those rules. For example, if judges consistently claim
that damage awards in contract cases exist to compensate successful
plaintiffs for harms they have suffered, then a successful theory must
account for the fact not only that the law awards damages but also for
the fact that damages are conceptualized as compensation.
B.

Dismissing Efficiency Theories

While Smith analyzes efficiency theories under all four criteria, the
transparency criterion proves decisive in his effort to reject those
theories. To be sure, he is quite sympathetic to the traditional antiutilitarian arguments that have been marshaled as moral objections to
efficiency as a normative criterion.Z5 On the other hand, Smith
concedes that for an interpretive theory, even ultimately valid moral
objections may be irrelevant. In order to satisfy the morality criterion
in its least demanding form, all that is necessary is that efficiency
theories make identifiably normative claims, which they clearly do.
Smith even seems willing to concede that efficiency theories are
among those that could be endorsed by reasonable people. Only under
the strong version of the moral criterion would efficiency theories,
according to Smith, suffer from a serious moral objection (p. 132).
Broadly speaking, he concludes that the fit objections to efficiency
theories are not compelling because he believes that economic analysis
is so indeterminate that one could construct plausible efficiency
arguments in favor of most important rules of contract law (p. 125).
In contrast, Smith believes the transparency criterion provides a
reason for rejecting efficiency theories regardless of one's opinion as
to their moral defensibility or the strength of the analytic connection
between law and morality. According to Smith, "arguably [the] most

25. See pp. 127-32; cf RONALD DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value, in A MAlTER OF
PRINCIPLE 237 (1985) (arguing that wealth maximization is a normatively unattractive
criterion for the law). For a more sophisticated set of arguments against efficiency norms
than those offered by either Smith or Dworkin, see JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS,
AND THE LAW 67-153 (1998).
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important objection to efficiency theories of contract law is that they
regard contract law as non-transparent, as hiding its own foundations"
(p. 132). Smith acknowledges that judges sometimes consider the
effects their rulings will have, but insists this reasoning is
inconsequential. Mainly, when judges and litigants make arguments in
contract cases, he asserts, they do not claim that damages are
necessary to deter future actors. Rather, they argue about what the
parties are entitled to as a matter of justice. In other words, legal
reasoning is always an ex post attempt to establish what rights litigants
are entitled to, while economic reasoning is always an ex ante attempt
to gauge future reactions to incentives created now. Accordingly,
Smith concludes that "[t]here is virtually no point of contact ...
between the legal explanation and the efficiency based explanation"
(p. 133). It is not that judges and lawyers employ less sophisticated
versions of the arguments made by law and economics scholars.
Rather, their arguments are of a fundamentally different kind.
This disjunction between legal arguments and economic
arguments, according to Smith, leaves efficiency theorists still
interested in offering an interpretive view of contract law with one of
two untenable reactions to the transparency argument. First, they can
argue that the arguments made by lawyers and judges are basically
insincere, a mere screen that obfuscates the real reasons for their
decisions. Smith dismisses this possibility by arguing that "to
successfully explain a self-reflective human practice, such as the law,
one of the things that must be explained - that must be made
intelligible- is how that practice understands itself" (p. 134). Hence,
the smoke-screen vision of legal reasoning fails as an interpretive
theory precisely because it fails to offer any explanation of a key
phenomenon. The second alternative for efficiency theorists,
according to Smith, is to assert that the law pursues efficiency, without
legal actors knowing about it, through some invisible-hand or
evolutionary mechanism. The problem with this approach, according
to Smith, is that it still fails to explain why legal actors choose to justify
rules in the way they do. Furthermore, given the sophistication of
judges and lawyers, Smith finds it implausible that they could be
systematically mistaken about the nature of the enterprise in which
they are engaged.
C.

The Failure of the Effort to Dismiss Efficiency Theories

Economic theorists could respond to Smith's arguments in a
number of ways. Some of them would no doubt simply brush aside the
transparency objection as meaningless. They would argue that they
are concerned with finding the optimal rules for contract law as it
should be, rather than finding some interpretation of contract law as it
is. In a sense, this response simply concedes Smith's point. These

Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law
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theorists would agree with him that their theories are simply about
different things. Even within the interpretive criteria that Smith sets
up, however, it is by no means obvious that economic theories can be
so easily dismissed. First, Smith's transparency argument conflates two
aspects of ex post reasoning. Once these two aspects are untangled,
the import of the ubiquitous ex post reasoning one sees in judicial
opinions becomes less telling than Smith believes. Second, judicial
reasoning is considerably less hostile to economic arguments than
Smith suggests. Finally, rights-based theories underdetermine the
content of certain rules that economic theories account for quite well.
As a result of this problem, Smith is forced into making the rather
implausible claim that certain well-established features of contract
doctrine, such as the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale,26 are not actually
part of contract law at all.
1.

The Two Forms of Ex Post Reasoning

Smith is correct to observe that much of judicial reasoning is
backward looking and focuses on the question of who is entitled to
what as a matter of pre-existing rights. It hardly follows from this fact,
however, that the basis of the law is the enforcement of pre-existing
moral rights. Judges are primarily concerned with determining the
rights the law confers on particular parties. The source judges use to
determine these rights is generally not some body of pre-existing
moral entitlements, but rather the pre-existing body of law. When a
judge rules that A has no good breach of contract claim against B
because their agreement was not memorialized as the Statute of
Frauds requires, she is making a statement about the contours of A
and B's legal rights. She is not, however, necessarily making a
statement about the moral foundations of the Statute of Frauds.
There is no reason that efficiency theorists must reject the notion
that judges should decide cases according to pre-existing rules, nor do
they question the basic belief that someone who holds a legal
entitlement has a legal right to that entitlement. Economic theories of
law are not attacks on the rule of law per se. Rather, they are
explanations for why the law takes one shape rather than another. For
example, one might argue that the expectation measure of damages
should be chosen over the reliance measure because it provides proper
incentives for disappointed parties to bring suits and for potential
breachers to take the optimal level of precautions to avoid those suits.
There is nothing about the ex ante shape of this argument, however,
that precludes one from also affirming that the disappointed promisee
of a breached contract has a legal right to her expectation damages. In

26. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
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short, one may believe that ex ante arguments provide the best
account for particular legal rules while also believing that ex post
analysis should be used to determine whether a particular person has a
particular entitlement under those rules.
Judicial decisions are mainly concerned more with the application
of pre-existing law to concrete facts than with the application of
normative theories to particular legal rules. Hence, it should not
surprise us to find that most legal discussions center around arguments
over the scope of pre-existing rights. That, after all, is what the parties
to a lawsuit are litigating. It is important to remember, however, that
these are pre-existing legal rights. It hardly follows from the fact that
judges are mainly concerned with these pre-existing legal rights that
that the law itself is best understood as enforcing pre-existing moral
rights. The preponderance of judicial cases are not about the
normative foundations of the law but about the application of the law
- regardless of its normative foundations - to particular cases. This
is what accounts for the preponderance of ex post arguments in the
judicial opinions. Tellingly, when judges do discuss the normative
foundations of the law, they use ex ante arguments with greater
frequency than Smith suggests.
2.

The Transparency of Economic Reasoning

It is simply not true that common law judges eschew the ex ante
perspective as completely as Smith implies. For example, in criticizing
the California Supreme Court's decision to adopt a "soft" version of
the parol evidence rule, 27 Judge Alex Kozinski wrote:
[The California Supreme Court's decision] casts a long shadow of
uncertainty over all transactions negotiated and executed under the law
of California. As this case illustrates, even when the transaction is very
sizeable, even if it involves only sophisticated parties, even if it was
negotiated with the aid of counsel, even if it results in contract language
that is devoid of ambiguity, costly and protracted litigation cannot be
avoided if one party has a strong enough motive for challenging the
contract. While this rule creates much business for lawyers and an
occasional windfall for clients, it leads only to frustration and delay for
most litigants and clogs already overburdened courts. 28

Note that Judge Kozinski's objections take an almost exclusively ex
ante approach, resting on the incentives that the rule creates for
litigation and the increased transaction costs it places on parties as
they attempt vainly to bargain around it. This kind of argument is not
confined to contemporary judges whose judicial opinions have been
27. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1969) (Traynor, J.).
28. Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988).
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somehow tainted by law and economics scholarship. Consider Judge
Danaher's dissent in the famous case of Williams v. Walker- Thomas
Furniture Co. 29 In that case, Judge Skelly Wright held that a crosscollateralization clause in a sales contract was potentially
unconscionable because of unequal bargaining power. In his dissent,
Judge Danaher reasoned:
There are many aspects of public policy here involved. What is a luxury
to some may seem an outright necessity to others. Is public oversight to
be required for the expenditures of relief funds? A washing machine,
e.g., in the hands of a relief client might become a fruitful source of
income. Many relief clients may well need credit, and certain business
establishments will take long chances on the sale of items, expecting their
pricing policies will afford a degree of protection commensurate with the
risk. 30

Judge Danaher's defense of the traditional rule that courts will not
examine the adequacy of consideration is based on explicitly ex ante
reasoning. There is no discussion of the ex post rights of the defendant
in the case, but rather an analysis of how the incentives the rule
creates will impact the availability of credit and capital for the very
poor.
Nor is such reasoning confined to recent judicial decisions. In 1854,
Baron Alderson issued his opinion in the famous case of Hadley v.
Baxendale. 31 The opm10n stated a two-part rule governing
consequential damages in breach of contract cases. The first part of
the rule is that a plaintiff can recover only those damages that were
reasonably foreseeable to the breaching promisor. The second part of
the rule is that where the plaintiff has specifically communicated to the
defendant that certain consequences will flow from a failure to
perform, the defendant becomes liable for those consequences, even if
they otherwise would not be reasonably foreseeable. Baron Alderson
justified the rule thus:
[I]f these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party
breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have
had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise
generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special
circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special
circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for
the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case;
and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them. 32

29. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
30. !d. at 450 (Danaher, J., dissenting).
31. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
32. !d. at 151.
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Note that Baron Alderson's ex ante reasoning here is quite subtle.
Simple efficiency theories of damages tend to focus on how to induce
efficient performance and breach of obligations. 33 Baron Alderson,
however, employs what Richard Craswell has called "second-'
generation efficiency," which asks what effect rules have on the
contracts that are negotiated. 34 Thus, Baron Alderson justifies the
specially communicated rule in terms of the incentives it creates for
the parties at the time of negotiation. To be sure, some of the language
of justice remains, but the argument nevertheless explicitly looks to
the incentives to negotiate that the rule creates.
3.

Underdetermination and Line Drawing

The rule in Hadley v. Baxendale illustrates the third problem with
Smith's attempt to dismiss economic theories: the promissory theory
he espouses underdetermines certain rules. Economic theorists can
neatly explain the holding in the case in terms of incentives and
information. 35 When parties enter a contract they have imperfect
information about the other party's situation, which can result in
inefficiencies. For example, it is efficient for the promisor to take any
precaution to avoid breach of his promise that is less than the value of
that promise to the promisee. At the time of contracting, however, the
promisor may not know the value of the promise to the promisee.
Indeed, during negotiations the promisee has incentives to conceal the
true value of the potential promise in order to get a better price. As a
result, the promisor may take inefficiently few precautions to avoid
breach. As Baron Alderson suggested, however, limiting the
promisee's damages to those that are reasonably foreseeable creates
incentives for parties to negotiate around this problem. Because the
promisee cannot recover damages for losses that are in effect invisible
to the promisor at the time of breach, this rule gives the promisee an
incentive to disclose this information when negotiating. Once the
hidden information is communicated, the promisor has an incentive to
take the efficient level of precautions to avoid breach because he will
be liable for the full amount of the promisee's damages.
Although he does not address the economic justifications offered
for the rule in Hadley, Smith is generally critical of economic theories
of damages. His main objection is that no single rule can create

33. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 117-20 (4th ed. 1992)
(discussing the theory of efficient breach).
34. See Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in THE
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 19 (Peter Benson ed., 2002).
35. See Ian Ayers & Robert Gerner, Filling the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 101-04 (1989) (discussing the holding in
Hadley as a penalty default rule).
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efficient incentives for all parties to a contract. Hence, while
expectation damages may create efficient incentives for parties
choosing whether or not to breach their contracts, they create
inefficient incentives for those choosing the extent to which they
should rely on the promises of others. 36
Smith himself, however, does not provide a satisfying account of
the rule in Hadley. The rights-based approach, he argues, implies that
contract damages are explainable in terms of corrective justice. "This
explanation is consistent, in broad terms," he argues, "with the
principle that victims of breach have a right to compensatory
damages" (p. 412). Beyond this, however, Smith seems to deny that his
account of contractual obligation has any concrete implications for
damages rules. Rather, he argues that it is unnecessary for a theory of
contract law to explain the remoteness rule in Hadley (or any other
rule regarding contract damages). "[T]he answers [to these
questions]," he argues, "will not tell us anything special about
contractual obligations" (p. 427). He offers two reasons for why this is
so.
Smith's first claim is that the rule in contract damages does not
actually exist. Rather, he denies that there is any distinction between
the foreseeability or remoteness rule applied in torts 37 and the rule
applied in contracts, arguing that any apparent differences can be
accounted for in terms of different factual circumstances (pp. 426-27).
While he cites an English case in support of his position,38 as a
doctrinal matter his claim is at least doubtful. 39 Smith's doctrinal
reformulation, however, is less important than his second reason.
36. Pp. 410-11. Smith does not, however, deny that it is logically possible to come up
with a socially efficient measure of damages. He simply believes that it is virtually impossible
to identify it:
[I)n theory it might well be that the expectation measure is produces the most efficient
aggregate behavior (if it could be proved, say, that the breach decision overwhelms all
others). But making the necessary calculation is complex to say the least. I doubt that such a
calculation has or even could be attempted. As was true [for other economic issues) the
relevant quantitative data is not available.
/d.

37. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (stating the remoteness
rule in tort); cf Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854) (stating the remoteness
rule in contract).
38. H Parson (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., 1978 All. E.R. 525 (C.A.), Q.B
791, cited at p. 427 n.54.
39. For example, it is a well established rule that generally speaking one cannot recover
for emotional distress as a result of a breach of contract. See, e.g., Rubin v. Matthews
Internment Corp., 503 A.2d 694 (Me. 1986) (emotional distress damages generally not
recoverable in contract); Moffet v. Kan. City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 244 P.2d 228 (Kan.
1952) (same). In contrast, such damages are not too remote in the tort context. See, e.g.,
Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961) (allowing recovery in tort for intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal.
1952) (same).
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Smith's second, and more philosophically interesting, justification
for not accounting for the rule in Hadley is that it is not actually a rule
of contract law at all and hence need not be explained by a complete
theory of contract. Rather, he argues, "[t]he justification and meaning
of remoteness is a general question for the law of obligations" (p. 427).
Smith makes this move for at least two reasons. First, he argues,
consistent with his view of promising as creating a uniquely valuable
entitlement where none existed before, that the infringement of a
contractual right through breach is analogous to a misappropriation of
-or negligent damage to- property (p. 104). Just as these wrongs
are not considered part of property law, Smith claims that "nonperformance should not be regarded as part of contract law" (p. 104).
Second, and more tellingly, he claims that "[a]s for remedial rules, the
promissory account [of contract] has nothing special to say about how
remedies for breach of contract should be classified. " 40 This sort of
shifting of the boundaries of contract law to save the promissory
theory from embarrassment has been done before. Charles Fried, for
example, denied that contract law had anything to do with those legal
default rules whose content could not be determined by his promise
principle. 41
There is a deus ex machina quality to this argument. The
fundamental problem is that Smith and Fried do not provide any
arguments for defining the scope of contract law independent of the
promise theory itself. Without such a theory-independent argument, a
vicious circularity arises, with the theory of explanation being used to
define what is to be explained and then citing its ability to explain this
limited domain as evidence of the theory's success. To take an
extreme example, it is as though one set out to explain the phenomena
of "games," and first argued that "games" were those social
interactions between two people over an eight-by-eight board with
thirty-two pieces that conform to the rules of chess. Having made this
move, the ability of the rules of chess to explain these particular social
interactions would then be taken as evidence that the rules of chess
constitute a successful theory of games!
IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF PRINCIPLED PLURALISM
The apparent failure of Smith's project of unification does not
mean that we are left inevitably to "the good gray compromise of
competing principles." It should, however, lead those who believe that
"theory works" to re-examine an important insight provided by theory

40. P. 104; cf Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989).
41. See FRIED, supra note 8, at 69.
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skeptics. The lure of pragmatism in contract law lies in the fact that
most lawyers and judges have powerful intuitions that there are
several legitimate values at stake in the law. Autonomy, welfare, and
justice are all in play, and most people believe all of these things
matter to some degree. If, as Contract Theory suggests, a unified
theory resting on an exclusive commitment to a single normative
principle is unlikely to succeed, theorists ought to turn their attention
to whether it is possible to integrate these competing values in a
principled way. Indeed, in the absence of a compelling unified theory,
the alternative to a principled integration would be the perpetual
exercise in ad hoc balancing that the "theory works" partisans wish to
avoid. What follows sketches an approach to such a principled
integration. Articulating a complete theory of contract law is beyond
the scope of this Review. I do believe, however, that a successful
theory will ultimately need to take the form of something like this:
Contract law ought to be understood in terms of a two-tiered ordering
of autonomy and efficiency. Both values ought to be pursued, but
where they conflict, autonomy should act as a "trump" value.
A.

Contract Law and the Priority of Liberty

John Rawls has argued that the first principle of justice is that
"each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for
others. " 42 For Rawls, the principle of equal liberty enjoys priority over
other concerns. Hence, while one may limit basic liberties in the name
of liberty itself, one cannot limit basic liberties in order to secure other
goals, such as distributive justice or increased levels of welfare. Rawls
offers a variety of arguments for this privileged position for liberty, 43
many of which have been subject to criticism,44 but the most
compelling argument rests on the notion of self-determination.45
Human beings in a liberal society have competing conceptions about
what constitutes the ultimate good or where ultimate values lie. In
ordering such a society, it follows that the most important concern
should be to preserve the ability of people to choose and pursue a
conception of the good. This is what the priority of liberty allows them
to do. Its priority is justified precisely because it serves, in a sense, to

42. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (rev. ed. 1999).
43. See, e.g., id. at 130-39.
44. See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of
Justice, 70 J. OF PHIL. 245 (1973); H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, in
READING RAWLS 230 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975).
45. My interpretation of Rawls' priority principle follows Robert S. Taylor, Rawls's
Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 246
(2003).
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protect citizens' access to ultimate values by guaranteeing them a
sphere in which to work out their own conceptions of the good.
This argument is useful for contract theory because it prioritizes
liberty without necessarily committing itself to any outright hostility
toward competing values. For example, it is still permissible to pursue
increases in social welfare under this theory, so long as such pursuits
do not threaten equal liberties. Hence, we seem to have at least an
initially plausible reason for choosing efficiency in one sphere (those
areas where liberty is not implicated) while placing emphasis on
autonomy in another sphere (those areas where liberty conflicts with
other concerns). The theory's value lies in its ability to provide
principled reasons for using autonomy as a criterion some of the time
and using efficiency at other times. This tracks the intuition at the
heart of the pragmatic approach by acknowledging that apparently
competing values both have legitimate claims. It does not commit us,
however, to a "good gray compromise of competing values," but
rather provides us reasons for consistently ordering those values.
Rawls, like most political philosophers, has little interest in private
law and apparently even less knowledge of the intricate rules with
which a legal theorist must cope. Hence, A Theory of Justice doesn't
provide any concrete discussion of contract law other than to affirm
that "freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissezfaire [is] not [a] basic [liberty]. " 46 There are no arguments as to why
this is so, and one suspects that Rawls is simply eager to demonstrate
that his concept of the priority of liberty is different from the more
libertarian liberalism of the nineteenth century. As I shall argue
below, however, this is an imaginary bogey man, as there is no a priori
reason to believe that including freedom of contract in the catalog of
basic liberties leads inevitably to the laissez-faire capitalism Rawls
clearly rejects. Other than this unhelpful swipe at freedom of contract,
it looks as though the Rawl's priority of liberty, despite its apparent
theoretical usefulness, is at too high a level of abstraction to be
jurisprudentially useful. As Charles Fried observed in a slightly
different context:
The picture· I have ... is of philosophy proposing an elaborate structure
of arguments and considerations which descend from on high but stop
some twenty feet above the ground. It is the peculiar task of law to
complete this structure of ideals and values, to bring it down to earth; to
complete it so that it is seated firmly and concretely and shelters real
human beings against the storms of passion and conflict. 47

46. RAWLS, supra note 42, at 54.
47. Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 35,57 (1981).
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At this point what is needed is a concept that will act as a bridge from
the abstraction of the priority of liberty to the "thickets of the law." 48
Promissory theories are useful here because some share the same
liberal assumptions as Rawls's argument. For example, Fried also
envisions a society where citizens pursue differing visions of the good
life. Indeed, what Fried calls the "first principle of liberal political
morality" reads very much like Rawls's priority principle: "[W]hatever
we accomplish and however that accomplishment is judged, morality
requires that we respect the person and property of others, leaving
them free to make their lives as we are left free to make ours. This is
the liberal ideal." 49
Promising is valuable precisely because it allows us to enlist the
help of others in pursuing our vision of the good without
impermissibly imposing our will on them. We can enlist their help
because promising allows us to commit ourselves morally in ways that
invite the trust and confidence of others. "To renege is to abuse a
confidence he [i.e. the promisor] was free to invite or not, and which
he intentionally did invite. To abuse that confidence now is like (but
only like) lying: the abuse of a shared social institutions that is
intended to invoke the bonds of trust." 50 Such an abuse, according to
Fried, violates the liberal ideal. Obviously, the validity of this
argument is controversial. It does, however, suggest that providing a
remedy for the breach of a promise can be traced back to the priority
of equal liberty. Such a remedy protects people from the violation of
the rights that they gained when others promised to perform on their
behalf. To do otherwise would be to allow a promisor to treat a
promisee as a mere means to his own ends. It would deny in effect that
the disappointed promisee is a being entitled to choose his own vision
of the good free from the illegitimate manipulation of others. 51 Hence,
promising provides a way of enlarging the scope of the freedom
available to all, and contract law, which ultimately provides a remedy
for the breach of promises, protects the rights created by that enlarged
sphere of liberty.
I am not offering a brief for Fried's theory or other promissory
theories. I find them ultimately unpersuasive for many of the same
reasons I find Smith's theory unpersuasive. Fried's ambition is
theoretical unity; therefore, he, like Smith, must deny the claims of
competing approaches and stretch the concept of promising in
implausible ways in order to account for much of contract doctrine.

48. See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 67 (1962).
49. See FRIED, supra note 8, at 7.
50. /d. at 16.
51. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35 (James
W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g Co., 1981) (1785).
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Fried is useful not because his is a complete theory of contract, but
because he provides a link between the lexical ordering provided by
Rawls and something close enough to contract law that we can use it
to provide the beginnings of a legal theory. Fortunately the priority
(rather than the exclusivity) of liberty relieves us of the need to trace
all rules of contract law to a single source. We can have pluralism
without incoherence.
The priority of liberty has some concrete implications for contract
law. It suggests that, by and large, promises ought to be enforced in
some way. It also suggests that the scope of obligations should at least
track the intentions of promisors. Translated into doctrinal terms, this
means that autonomy ought to provide the primary basis for
specifying the rules of contract formation and interpretation. This
does not, however, necessarily mean that there should be no
limitations on freedom of contract. Contrary to the fears of Rawls
himself, acknowledging the basic liberty to contract does not
automatically commit one to the dreaded "doctrine of laissez-faire." It
does mean, however, that limitations on contractual freedom, such as
those in the doctrines of consideration, capacity, and
unconscionability, need to be justified in terms of preserving equal
liberty. The priority of liberty does not mean that there are no
restrictions of personal freedom. It simply means that those
restrictions must be justified with reference to the concept of liberty
rather than with reference to welfare, distributive justice, or some
other value.
For example, Lon Fuller's famous claim that the doctrine of
consideration serves to channel the intention of parties and ensure
that legal obligations represent deliberate decisions suggests that
consideration can be plausibly seen as a way of ensuring that contract
enforcement more closely tracks the deliberate exercise of liberty. 52 In
other words, the restriction on contractual freedom represented by the
doctrine of consideration can be justified in terms of liberty itself.
Contractual disabilities based on infancy or diminished capacity
likewise serve to ensure that legal obligations arise from truly
autonomous decision making. Similar arguments could be employed
to justify various forms of unconscionability, particularly so-called
procedural unconscionability. 53 All of these arguments are open to
dispute. The important thing is to see that the priority of liberty
provides a context in which these debates can occur, as well as giving
us some sense of what sorts of criteria we should use. A visceral

52. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
53. See Dori Kimel, Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract, 21 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 473 (2001) (arguing that limitations on the freedom of contract can serve to
advance a perfection notion of liberty).
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hostility to laissez-faire, however, does not constitute a good objection
to the priority of liberty since the principle contains resources for
justifying restrictions on freedom of contract.
Liberty alone, however, is not a sufficiently powerful concept to
specify all of the rules of contract law. In particular, much of
contractual doctrine is specifically concerned with how to resolve
contract disputes in the absence of any overt choice on the parties'
part. For those committed to a unified theory of contract, this poses a
serious embarrassment to autonomy-based approaches. 54 If one
conceptualizes liberty as a superior value, however, rather than as an
exclusive value, there is no objection to employing welfare
considerations in specifying rules where liberty is not directly
implicated. Thorny issues remain, of course, about the scope of
liberty's domain. In particular, determining the precise scope of what
has or hasn't been decided by the parties can be difficult. The mere
fact of contractual silence cannot necessarily be taken as absence of
any intention on a particular point. Communication is inevitably
nested in a social context that carries a host of implicit assumptions
that must hold for any explicit communication to be intelligible. Lon
Fuller provided a typically pithy example: If an absent-minded
professor walks out of his office, he may not consciously be thinking
that the floor of the hallway will be there, but the floor's presence is
necessarily an implicit assumption of his actions. 55 In the same way,
contracting parties implicitly assume much about their transactions
that must be taken into consideration to give force to their intentions.
As Fried put it:
It is a truism in the philosophy of language that in interpreting a person's

words we are not guessing at the hidden but determined content of some
list of meanings in the speaker's head. Rather our concerns particularize,
render concrete, inchoate meanings .... Yet at some point it becomes
necessary to say not that this is what the speaker meant but rather that
this is what the speaker might have meant had he thought of it. 56

Once even the implicit intentions of the parties are exhausted,
however, the value of liberty no longer has a dog in the fight. 57 There
is no objection at this point to employing arguments derived from

54. See generally Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989).
55. See LON L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACf LAW 666 (1st ed. 1947) ("The absent-minded
professor stepping from his office into the hall as he reads a book 'assumes' that the floor of
the hall will be there to receive him. His conduct is conditioned and directed by this
assumption, even though the possibility that the floor has been removed does not 'occur' to
him, that is, is not present in his conscious mental processes.").
56. FRIED, supra note 8, at 60 (footnote omitted).
57. Cf Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687 (Jules Coleman eta!. eds., 2002).
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considerations of welfare, and efficiency arguments can enter our
theory of contract with full force. Indeed, one of the great theoretical
virtues of efficiency is that it can provide arguments that yield
relatively determinate answers in precisely those areas where
autonomy theories have difficulty providing concrete conclusions.
When faced with a well-established rule like that in Hadley v.
Baxendale, Smith was forced to resort to a variety of ultimately
unpersuasive stratagems to avoid the embarrassment created by the
fact that the promissory theory fails to yield any determinate answers
on the question. On the other hand, the economic theory of an
information-eliciting penalty default accounts for the rule quite nicely.
There are, of course, objections that can be put forward against
employing efficiency or welfare arguments to fill out a theory of
contract. One might argue that while liberty properly enjoys a superior
position, where it is not implicated one should turn to considerations
of fairness or distributive justice rather than efficiency. Efficiency,
after all, is indifferent to who enjoys the benefits of society's enlarged
pie. On the other hand, we may have important ethical reasons for
preferring some particular group - such as the poor or the virtuous.
The problem with this approach is that so long as there is substantial
contractual freedom, such attempts at distributive justice are likely to
be ineffective because, generally speaking, parties will contract away
from such rules if they are economically inefficient. 58 Of course, one
might be able to achieve such goals through contract law by limiting
the ability of parties to bargain away from the desired distributive
outcomes. The problem with this solution is that it violates the priority
of liberty. Remember, within this theory liberty may only be limited to
secure expanded liberty for all, not in the interest of other concerns
such as efficiency or distributive justice. It does not follow, of course,
that one cannot pursue such other concerns; one simply cannot pursue
them through contract law. Hence, one might be able to employ the
taxing and spending power to distribute wealth to deserving
constituencies without violating the theory of contract I am proposing
here.
The idea that distributive justice is best pursued through transfer
payments is a common argument among law and economics scholars. 59
It is important to realize, however, that the economic reasons offered
for this preference are quite different from the ones I offer above. The
economic argument asserts that distributively attractive but inefficient
rules should be eschewed in favor of taxing and spending because
58. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
59. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
119-124 (2d ed. 1989) (arguing that equity is best pursued through taxing and transfer
payments rather than legal rules governing the interactions between private parties).
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adopting efficient rules coupled with transfer payments increases
aggregate welfare while achieving the same distributive goals. The
argument from the priority of liberty, however, does not hinge on the
maximization of aggregate welfare. Indeed, if it did then one would
not be able to prefer liberty over efficiency when the two conflicted.
Rather, the argument against employing fairness or distributive justice
as a secondary value in place of efficiency flows from the priority of
liberty itself, because practically speaking such goals can only be
pursued in contract law by violating the priority of liberty.
B.

The Vertical Integration Strategy

The approach sketched in the previous paragraphs is no more than
an outline of a theory of contract. There are obvious gaps and
plausible objections. It does, however, provide a useful model of how
one should approach the problem of theoretical pluralism. Ultimately,
the argument above is an example of what Jody Kraus has called "the
vertical integration strategy." The vertical integration strategy deals
with the problem of conflict between consequential and rights-based
theories by ranking values hierarchically. In place of pragmatism it
"contemplate[s] . . . that both approaches may be combined as
logically distinct components of a united theory." 60 There are several
ways this might be done. One could argue, for example, that one
approach is foundational to the other approach. Daniel Farber, for
example, has proposed an argument along these lines, claiming that in
the context of contracts governing commercial transactions, a respect
for autonomy leads for a rule aimed at maximizing efficiency. 61
Alternatively, one could argue for the lexical superiority of one value
over another value. My argument takes this form. I do not claim that
efficiency can be derived from respect for autonomy or vice versa.
Rather, I simply offer an argument for why when the two values
conflict, one should be chosen over the other.
Regardless of the form taken, the vertical integration strategy
offers the best hope for a satisfying and coherent theory of contract.
So long as philosophers of law focus on a quest for a single master
value that explains all of contract law, their arguments are likely to run
into the same problems that, despite his ingenuity and subtlety, afflict
60. Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical
Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420,422 (2001).
61. See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and The Ex Ante Perspective, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54 (Jody S.
Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000). Like the theory that I offer in the text, Farber draws on
the philosophy of John Rawls in making his arguments. Farber, however, focuses on a
different part of Rawls' work, arguing that behind Rawls' famous veil of ignorance parties in
the Original Position would choose a regime of commercial law that aimed at the
maximization of efficiency.
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Smith's Contract Theory. The vertical integration strategy, in contrast,
responds to the pragmatic insight, acknowledging that competing
values of autonomy, efficiency, and justice all have their place in
contract law, without falling into the trap of ad hoc balancing between
them. 62
V.

CONCLUSION

Stephen Smith has produced an impressive and important book. It
provides a detailed and nearly comprehensive introduction to
contemporary theories of contract law. Perhaps more importantly, it
makes important original contributions both to the theory of
promising and contracts and to the larger issue of how scholars should
adjudicate between the claims of competing theories of the law.
Despite these considerable virtues, however, Smith's book is flawed by
the fact that it leaves largely unconsidered an important possibility for
contract theory: a principled integration of competing normative
approaches. To illustrate this, I offer an argument based on Rawls's
principle of the priority of liberty as one way in which autonomy and
efficiency could be held together in a single theory. My argument is an
example of the vertical integration strategy, which I believe is
ultimately the most fruitful direction in which philosophers of contract
law could move.

62. Kraus offers a second strategy for reconciling autonomy and efficiency, which he
labels the "horizontal independence" strategy. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract
Law: Groundwork for the Reconciliation of Autonomy and Efficiency, 1 Soc. POL. & LEGAL
PHIL. 385, 390-422 (2002). The heart of this argument is the claim that autonomy and
efficiency theories are actually theories about different things. Thus, Kraus offers the not
entirely plausible argument that efficiency theorists are primarily concerned with explaining
the outcomes of cases, while autonomy theorists are primarily concerned with explaining the
arguments that judges use. See generally Kraus, supra note 57. The problem with this
approach is at least twofold. First, it is open to the same objection that can be leveled against
Smith's anti-economic transparency argument, namely that judges actually do employ ex
ante reasoning quite regularly in their opinions. Second, and more importantly, the
"horizontal independence" strategy does not respond to the pragmatic insight, namely the
powerful intuition that as a normative matter autonomy, efficiency, and other values are all
important. When economic theories are reduced to intellectual constructs for predicting case
outcomes they lose their normative force and become little more than instrumentally useful
descriptive assumptions. Cf ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
74-79 (1988) (discussing instrumentalism in economics). In other words, the horizontal
independence strategy, as formulated by Kraus, does not acknowledge the intuition that
efficiency is a normatively- as opposed to purely descriptively- important concept.

